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Abstract—In this paper we develop a set of algorithms that can
detect the identities of malicious data-manipulators in distributed
optimization loops for estimating oscillation modes in large power
system models. The estimation is posed in terms of a consensus
problem among multiple local estimators that jointly solve for the
characteristic polynomial of the network model. If any of these
local estimates are compromised by a malicious attacker, resulting
in an incorrect value of the consensus variable, then the entire
estimation loop can be destabilized. We present four iterative
algorithms by which this instability can be quickly detected, and
the identities of the compromised estimators can be revealed.
The algorithms are solely based on the computed values of the
estimates, and do not need any information about the model of
the power system. Both large and covert attacks are considered.
Results are illustrated using simulations of a IEEE 68-bus power
system model.
Index Terms—Power systems, Malicious attacks, Data corrup-
tion, Oscillation monitoring, Distributed optimization, ADMM.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide-area measurement systems (WAMS) technology
using Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) has been regarded
as the key to guaranteeing stability, reliability, state estima-
tion, control, and protection of next-generation power systems
[1]. However, with the exponentially increasing number of
PMUs deployed in the North American grid, and the resulting
explosion in data volume, the design and deployment of an
efficient wide-area communication and computing infrastruc-
ture, especially from the point of view of resilience against a
wide varieties of nefarious cyber-physical attacks, is evolving
as one of the greatest challenges to the power system and
IT communities. With several thousands of networked PMUs
being scheduled to be installed in the United States by 2020,
exchange of Synchrophasor data between balancing authorities
for any type of wide-area control will involve several thou-
sands of Terabytes of data flow in real-time per event, thereby
opening up a wide spectrum of opportunities for adversaries
to induce data manipulation attacks, denial-of-service attacks,
GPS spoofing, attacks on transmission assets, and so on. The
challenge is even more aggravated by the gradual transition
of WAMS from centralized to distributed in order to facilitate
the speed of data processing [2] and [3].
Several recent papers such as [4]-[11] have studied how
false-data injection attacks may be deceptively injected into
a power grid using its state estimation loops, and through
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data in relays and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) [12].
Others have proposed estimation-based mitigation strategies to
secure the grid against many of these attacks [13]-[16]. The
fundamental approach behind many of these designs is based
on the so-called idea of Byzantine consensus [17]-[19], a fairly
popular topic in distributed computing, where the goal is to
drive an optimization or optimal control problem to a near-
optimal solution despite the presence of a malicious agent.
In practice, however, this approach is not acceptable to most
WAMS operators as they are far more interested in finding
out the identity of a malicious agent if it exists in the system,
disconnect it from the estimation or control loop, and continue
operation using the remaining non-malicious agents rather than
settling for a solution that keeps the attacker unidentified in the
loop. This basic question of how to catch malicious agents in
distributed wide-area monitoring applications is still an open
challenge in the WAMS literature.
In this paper we address this problem in the context of
identifying malicious data-manipulators in distributed opti-
mization loops for wide-area oscillation monitoring. The spe-
cific application of our interest is the estimation of electro-
mechanical oscillation modes or eigenvalues from streaming
PMU data following a small-signal disturbance in the grid
[20]. Accurate estimation of these oscillation modes is critical
to grid operators, as many control and protection decisions
depend on whether the damping and residues of the modes
are below a chosen threshold or not. The fundamental set-
up for the distributed optimization is based on the Alternating
Direction Multiplier Method (ADMM) [21]. The power system
is divided into multiple non-overlapping areas, each equipped
with a local estimator. These local estimators use local sensor
measurements of voltage, phase angle, and frequency from
PMUs to carry out a local regression algorithm for generating
a local estimate of the characteristic polynomial of the system,
and, thereafter, communicate this estimate to a central super-
visor. The supervisor computes the average or consensus of all
estimates, and broadcasts this consensus variable back to each
local estimator to be used in the next round of regression. If all
estimates are accurate, then ADMM is guaranteed to converge
asymptotically to the true optimal solution of the characteristic
polynomial, following which the central supervisor can solve
for its roots to obtain the desired eigenvalues. However, if one
or more of the local estimates are manipulated by attackers,
then the resulting consensus variable will be inaccurate, which,
in turn, will contaminate the accuracy of every local estimate.
Even a small amount of bias at a single iteration can destabilize
the entire estimation process. To combat this, we first develop
an algorithm to show how ADMM can be used by the central
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2supervisor to catch the identities of malicious estimators by
simply tracking the quality of every incoming estimate. This
algorithm, however, can become computationally expensive
if the network size is large. Therefore, we propose another
algorithm where the central supervisor, instead of computing
the average, employs a Round-Robin technique to generate the
consensus variable, and show that by tracking the evolution
of only this consensus variable it is possible to identify
the malicious estimators. Both large and covert attacks are
considered. We analyze the convergence properties of the
proposed algorithms, and illustrate their effectiveness using
simulation results on a IEEE 68-bus power system model.
Preliminary results on this problem for single-node attacks
have been reported in our recent paper [22]. This paper
expands those results to a more general case where attacks
may be imposed on multiple nodes, and the attack magnitude
can be either large or small, leading to a much more complex
set of algorithms and simulations. Moreover, unlike [22], here
we also show how the standard ADMM itself can be used for
attack detection for both large and covert attacks.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as
follows. Section II presents the power system model and the
mode estimation problem of interest, and formulates the attack
localization problem. Section III shows how to use standard
ADMM (S-ADMM) and its Round-Robin (RR) version for
localization of biases with noticeable magnitudes, respectively.
Section IV extends the idea to identify malicious users with
multiple small biases. Section V compares the RR-ADMM
with S-ADMM in terms of their convergence properties.
Section VI illustrates all the algorithms through simulations
of a IEEE 68-bus power system model. Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. MODE ESTIMATION USING DISTRIBUTED ADMM
A. Problem Set up Using Standard ADMM
Consider a power system with n synchronous generators
and nl loads connected by a given topology. Each synchronous
generator is modeled by a second-order swing equation, and
each bus is modeled by two algebraic equations for active and
reactive power balance. The measured output y(t) ∈ Rp is
considered to be a set of measurements of small-signal values
of bus voltages, phase angles, and frequencies, denoted, in
general, by yi(t), i = 1, . . . , p, measured at p ≤ (n + nl)
designated buses using PMUs. Following a disturbance, which
can be simply assumed to be a unit impulse function, the
impulse response of the ith output can be written as
yi(t) =
2n∑
k=1
ri,ke
(−σk+jΩk)t + r∗i,ke
(−σk−jΩk)t, (1)
for i = 1, . . . , p, where λk = (−σk ± jΩk), (j =
√−1),
are the complex eigenvalues (or modes) of the small-signal
electro-mechanical model of the power system. Ωk > 0 and
σk > 0 are the frequency and damping factor of the kth mode,
respectively, while rik is the residue of the kth mode in the
ith output. In order to estimate these 2n complex eigenvalues
λk from y(t) one may employ centralized techniques such
as Prony’s algorithm. We briefly recapitulate that algorithm to
Fig. 1. Distributed architecture for a 4-area power system network
motivate our problem. Sampling yi(t) with a uniform sampling
period of T , a generic expression for the z-transform of
yi(m) , yi(t)|t=mT , (m = 0, 1, . . . ,M ), can be written as
yi(z) =
b0i + b1iz
−1 + b2iz−2 + · · ·+ b2niz−2n
1 + a1z−1 + a2z−2 + · · ·+ a2nz−2n , (2)
where a’s and b’s are constant coefficients of the characteristic
polynomial and the zero polynomial, respectively. The roots
of the characteristic polynomial will provide the discrete-time
poles of the system. One can, therefore, first estimate the
coefficient vector a : {a1, . . . , a2n}, compute the discrete-
time poles, and finally convert them to the continuous-time
poles to obtain σk and Ωk, for k = 1, . . . , 2n, as follows [20]:
Step 1. Solve for a from
yi(2n)
yi(2n+ 1)
...
yi(2n+ `)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ci
=

yi(2n− 1) · · · yi(0)
yi(2n) · · · yi(1)
...
...
yi(2n+ `− 1) · · · yi(`)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hi

−a1
−a2
...
−a2n

︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
,
(3)
where ` is an integer satisfying 2n+` ≤M−1. Concatenating
ci and Hi in (3) for i = 1, . . . , p, one can find a by solving
a least-squares (LS) problem
min
a
1
2
||
H1...
Hp
a−
c1...
cp
 ||2, (4)
where || · || denotes the 2-norm of a vector.
Step 2. Find the roots of the discrete-time characteristic
polynomial, say denoted by zk, k = 1, . . . , 2n. Then, the
desired eigenvalues λk are equal to ln(zk)/T .
The centralized approach, however, becomes computation-
ally untenable as more and more PMUs are installed in the
system. Instead a distributed solution is much more preferable.
Fortunately, the LS problem (4) can be reformulated as a
global consensus problem over a distributed network of N
computational areas spanning the entire grid, as shown in our
3recent paper [2]. We briefly recall that distributed architecture
before stating our main problem statement. An example of the
architecture with four areas is shown in Fig. 1. We assume each
area to be equipped with one local Phasor Data Concentrator
(PDC) (located at its control center). These PDCs receive local
PMU measurements, run a local LS using these measurements,
and then share the estimated parameters with a supervisory
PDC at the ISO. For convenience, we will refer to the PDCs
inside the areas as ‘local PDC’ and the PDC at the ISO as
‘central PDC’ as indicated in Fig. 1. Let the indices of the
PMUs in the mth area be i1, i2, . . . , imi . The problem (4)
then can be rewritten as
min
a1,...,aN ,z
N∑
i=1
1
2
||Hˆiai − cˆi||2, s.t ai − z = 0, (5)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where ai is the vector of the pri-
mal variables, z is the global consensus variable, Hˆi =
[HTi1 ,H
T
i2 , . . . ,H
T
imi
]T, and cˆi = [ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cimi ]
T. Each
block element of Hˆi and cˆi can be constructed after the dis-
turbance using the data matrices shown in (3). The estimators
can wait up to a certain number of samples, say 2n + ` as
indicated in (3), and gather the local measurements up to that
iteration. The iteration index k = 0 in the algorithms stated
hereafter starts from this instant of time. The global consensus
solution of (5) is achieved when the local estimations of the
N regional PDCs, ai, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N , reach the same value.
To solve (5) in a distributed way, we use ADMM [21], which
reduces to the following set of recursive updates by using an
augmented Lagrangian (for details, please refer to [2]):
wki = w
k−1
i + ρ(a
k
i − zk), (6a)
ak+1i = ((Hˆi)
T Hˆi + ρI)
−1((Hˆi)T cˆi −wki + ρzk), (6b)
zk+1 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ak+1i , (6c)
where wi is the vector of the dual variables, or the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (5), and ρ > 0 denotes the penalty
factor. To distinguish it from another variant of ADMM to be
proposed later in the paper, we will refer to (6) as the standard
ADMM, or S-ADMM in short. In [2] we developed the cyber-
physical architecture by which local PDCs and the central PDC
can exchange information between each other for executing S-
ADMM. We summarize that architecture as follows. Consider
the kth iteration. Step 1) any local PDC i runs the dual-primal
update for (wki , a
k+1
i ) using (6a) and (6b), after receiving
the consensus variable zk from the central PDC; Step 2) the
local PDC i transmits ak+1i to a central PDC; Step 3) the
central PDC calculates the consensus variable zk+1 using (6c);
Step 4) the central PDC broadcasts zk+1 to the local PDCs
in each area for their next update. Since the LS problem is
convex, therefore as k → ∞, zk in (6c) converges to z∗
which is the solution of the centralized problem (5). Also,
because of consensus, every akj converges to z
∗, 1 ≤ j ≤ N ;
Step 5) finally, the central PDC estimates the eigenvalues
of the small-signal model by solving for the roots of the
characteristic polynomial given by z∗. Detailed discussions on
the scalability and convergence for this ADMM-based mode
estimation problem can be found in [2] and [3]. We skip those
results here for the sake of brevity.
B. Problem Formulation for Attack Identification
Since companies may not employ expensive dedicated fiber
optic networks for message passing with the ISO, the com-
munication between the local PDCs and the central PDC is
most likely to happen over an open wide-area communication
network, making it is easy for attackers to hack into the PDCs,
and corrupt the value of their estimates. The attack model is
defined as follows. The attacker has the knowledge of the data
matrices Hˆi and cˆi, and the estimates aki and w
k−1
i ∀k, with
i ∈ S where S is the set of indices of all attacked PDCs.
Because the ISO does not know that the message is corrupted,
it will still calculate the consensus variable by averaging the
estimates obtained from all individual local PDCs. Thus zk in
(6c) will become
zk = ∆k +
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
aki
)
, (7)
where ∆k = 1N
( ∑
j=1,j∈S
∆kj
)
. Notice that here we consider
any number of local PDCs to be attacked, as long as there
is at least one unattacked PDC, and that the bias ∆kj may
be time-varying and of arbitrary magnitude. Denoting Aj :=
((Hˆj)
THˆj + ρI2n)
−1, and Cj := (Hˆj)Tcj , following the
expression of the consensus variable with bias as in (7), the
S-ADMM algorithm in (6) can be written in a state-variable
form:[
ak+1
ak
]
=
[
L11 L12
I 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
[
ak
ak−1
]
+
[
P
0
]
∆k, (8)
where P =

ρA1
ρA2
...
ρAN
, L12 = −

ρA1
N . . .
ρA1
N
...
. . .
...
ρAN
N . . .
ρAN
N
, and
L11 =
I + (2−N)ρN A1
2ρA1
N . . .
2ρA1
N
2ρA2
N I +
(2−N)ρ
N A2 . . .
2ρA2
N
...
...
...
...
2ρAN
N . . .
2ρAN
N I +
(2−N)ρ
N AN
 .
(9)
The rows of L in (8) add up to 1, and so when ∆kj = 0
then the trajectories of aki for every i = 1, . . . , N converge
asymptotically to consensus, as shown in [21]. However, when
the arbitrary disturbance ∆kj is added then these trajectories
will diverge unless ∆kj is chosen in a special way so that
its entries corresponding to the consensus modes are exactly
zeros. That, however, is very unlikely to happen as the attacker
will not know the matrix L prior to the attack, and, therefore,
cannot use any information about its consensus properties for
designing ∆kj . In any case, the attacker would benefit most if
4aki start diverging, implying that she has been able to destabi-
lize the estimation loop. Detecting the identity of the corrupted
PDC is, therefore, is crucial to retain normal operation of
the loop. In the following sections, we propose a variety of
algorithms to catch the identity of these data manipulators,
starting with S-ADMM and then its round-robbin version. We
also consider the case when ∆jk is small or covert, and show
how S-ADMM can be used for the detection by reducing
the penalty parameter ρ. In that situation the round-robbin
algorithm can also detect the identity of the manipulators
by monitoring the dual variable wkj without requiring any
knowledge of the individual estimates akj , thereby saving
computation cost.
It should also be noted that the algorithms presented in the
following sections are solely based on the computed values of
the primal and dual variables of ADMM. They do not need
any information about the power system model parameters,
nor the PMU measurements yi. This is the main difference
between our work and the work in [23]. In [23], the authors
derived detectability results based on the properties of the state
matrix L in (8). In our problem set-up, however, L consists
of the Hankel matrices Hˆi and cˆi, both of which are filled
with the measured outputs yi. The inherent assumption is that
the central PDC does not have direct access to any yi, and
therefore, does not know anything about the matrix L. It only
has access to the estimates ai and the dual variables wi,
i = 1, . . . , N , and, therefore, must algorithmically figure out
the detection and identification mechanisms based on these
two variables only. This is the main contribution of the paper,
compared to the model-based results of [23].
III. DATA MANIPULATIONS WITH GENERAL BIASES
A. Detecton of attacks
For the ADMM algorithm stated in Section II, local PDCs
only need to transmit the primal variable akj to the central
PDC. To make the algorithm attack-resilient, we next show
that the central PDC can mandate all the local PDCs to
transmit both akj and w
k−1
j .
We denote the value of aki received at the central PDC at it-
eration k as a¯ki . We define a¯
k = [(a¯k1)
T, (a¯k2)
T, . . . , (a¯kN )
T]T.
If i ∈ S , a¯ki = aki + ∆ki ; otherwise, a¯ki = aki . If
there is no attacker in the system, then at the first iteration
1
N
N∑
i=1
a¯1i =
1
N
N∑
i=1
a1i = z
1. According to (6a) then we have
1
N
N∑
i
wji = 02n×1, j = 0 or 1, where 02n×1 is a 2n × 1
matrix whose elements are all zeros; while if any PDC is
biased, then z1 = 1N
N∑
i=1
a¯1i =
1
N
N∑
i=1
a1i + ∆
1 and, hence,
1
N
N∑
i=1
w1i = −ρ∆1. Thus the central PDC can detect the
presence of malicious users at the second iteration by simply
checking the average value of the dual variables. Next we will
describe two algorithms by which central PDC can identify
which local PDCs are malicious.
B. S-ADMM for Identifying Malicious PDCs
For any pair of PDCs (i, j), we define the quantity dki,j =
a¯ki − akj . For i ∈ S and j /∈ S, from (8) one can write
dk+1i,j = a¯
k+1
i − a¯k+1j
= (Li −Lj)a˜k + (P i − P j)∆k + ∆k+1i , (10)
where a˜k =
[
ak
ak−1
]
, and Li and P i are the ith (2n×2nN)
block rows of L and P , respectively. On the other hand, for
i, j /∈ S,
dk+1i,j = (Li −Lj)a˜k + (P i − P j)∆k. (11)
Comparing (10) and (11), it can be seen that if the minimum
absolute value of a non-zero element of ∆k+1i is large enough,
then the difference of estimates between two non-malicious
PDCs can be much smaller compared to the difference be-
tween any malicious PDC and any non-malicious PDC. Thus,
at any iteration the central PDC will be able to separate the
incoming messages into at least two groups based of the values
of the biases by simply computing the difference between
every pair of messages arriving from the local PDCs. The
messages without biases will belong to the same group. We
define a threshold γka to identify the group members at iteration
k as scalar threshold:
γka = min
{ ||a¯kmax|| − ||a¯kmin||
N
, N(||a¯kmin2|| − ||a¯kmin||)
}
,
(12)
where ||a¯kmax||, ||a¯kmin||, and ||a¯kmin2|| are the maximum,
minimum, second minimum values of ||a¯kj ||, 1 ≤ j ≤ N ,
respectively. The norm symbol here represents the Euclidian
norm. In what follows, we will simply use the symbol || · ||
to represent Euclidian norm. If |||a¯kj ||− ||a¯ki ||| ≤ γka , then the
central PDC classifies the vectors akj and a
k
i to be in the same
group; otherwise, akj and a
k
i are treated to be in the different
groups.
Note that, ||a¯ki || − ||a¯kj || = ||aki + ∆ki || − ||akj ||, i ∈ S and
j /∈ S. After a few calculations it can be easily shown that for
successful localization, i.e., for making ||a¯ki || − ||a¯kj || > γka ,
the bias ∆ki must satisfy
||∆ki ||∞ − ∆
k
max
N
>
||akmax|| − ||akmin||
N
+ ||akj || − ||aki ||∞ (13)
||∆ki ||∞ > N
(||akmin2|| − ||akmin||) + ||akj || − ||aki ||∞, (14)
for all k, where || · ||∞ represents maximum norm. Otherwise,
if i, j /∈ S ||a¯ki ||−||a¯kj || = ||aki ||−||akj ||, to guarantee ||a¯ki ||−
||a¯kj || < γka , ∆kmax must satisfy
||∆kmax||∞ > N
(||aki || − ||akj ||)+ ||a||kmin − ||akmax||∞.
(15)
If the biases satisfy the requirements as in (13)-(15), then
S-ADMM can successfully identify the malicious PDCs by
simply tracking the differences |||a¯ki || − ||a¯kj |||. In reality,
however, these lower bounds may not mean much since the
fundamental rationale behind the detection and localization
are all based on the quality of the estimates, which depend on
the numerical magnitude of the measurements that are specific
5Algorithm 1 Identifying malicious PDCs injected with general
biases using S-ADMM
Detection:
1) At k = 1 every local PDC computes ak+1j in (6b) and w
k
j
in (6a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits these two to the central
PDC.
2) At k = 2 the central PDC calculates 1N
N∑
i=1
w1i . If
1
N
N∑
i=1
w1i 6= 02n×1, it suspects that there exists one or more
malicious PDCs in the system.
Identification:
3) If Step 2 is positive, for all k > 2 the central PDC computes
the difference |||a¯ki ||−||a¯kj |||, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , and the threshold
γka . It then compares these differences to the threshold, and
separates a¯k into groups.
4) The central PDC finds the index j of the vectors a¯kj , 1 ≤
j ≤ N , whose 2-norm is minimum. It then picks the group
where the vector with this index is located, and classifies this
group as unbiased.
5) The central PDC repeats this classification for a sufficiently
large iteration s. If the identified non-malicious PDCs are
consistent through these iterations, it finally confirms that these
PDCs are unbiased.
6) Onwards from iteration s + 3, the central PDC ignores
any message coming from the malicious PDCs, and simply
carries out S-ADMM with the remaining non-malicious PDCs
using (6). The final solution of this S-ADMM will lead to the
solution of (5) as the LS problem is convex with s+ 3 being
an initial iteration for the rest of the non-malicious S-ADMM.
to that particular distance event. Algorithm 1 summarizes the
implementation of this simple method.
Since the success of this algorithm is contingent on the
quality of the estimates, it is difficult to specify a universial
lower bound for s in Step 4. Generally, one would choose s
to be large, but it actual value must be decided on a case-
by-case basis. Also, note that after identifying the attacked
PDCs, Step 6 of the algorithm eliminates these PDCs, and
continues normal estimation using the good PDCs. The reason
why omitting a certain set of PDCs translates into retainment
of stability is because the original least-squares problem in (5)
is based on consensus. This means that if every node estimates
ai correctly, then the ADMM algorithm is guaranteed to
converge to the centralized least-squares solution a [21]. More
importantly, the solution for this convergence does not depend
on how many PDCs are there in the system. As every PDC is
trying to reach the same optimal point a, it does not matter
whether there are N PDCs, or less than N PDCs. The speed
of convergence, of course, may slow down as more and more
PDCs are omitted, but the final solution will remain the same.
We illustrate the approach with a simple example. Consider
a system with 5 local PDCs. The second and third PDCs are
respectively injected with ∆k2 = δ
k
212n×1 and ∆
k
3 = δ
k
312n×1,
where δk2 and δ
k
3 are two different arbitrary time-varying
numbers and 12n×1 is a 2n × 1 vector with all elements
one. All other PDCs are unbiased. Fig. 2 shows the first
Fig. 2. Evolution of the norms of the local estimates, and the average zk
before and after detection using S-ADMM. For convenience, we only show
the first element of zk .
element of the consensus vector zk before and after detecting
the malicious PDCs uing Algorithm 1. In the figure, it can
be seen that at iteration k = 2 we have ||a¯21|| = 4.1864,
||a¯22|| = 17.7189, ||a¯23|| = 9.5428, ||a¯24|| = 4.3161, ||a¯25|| =
4.2459. Thus, ||a¯2max|| = 17.7189, ||a¯2min|| = 4.1864, and
||a¯2min2|| = 4.2459. The threshold, therefore, is γ2a = 0.2975.
The estimates a¯2 are separated into three groups: a¯21, a¯
2
4,
and a¯25 are in the first group, a¯
2
2 and a¯
2
3 are in the second
and the third groups, respectively. The magnitude ||a¯21|| in
the first group is minimum. Thus, PDCs 1, 4 and 5 are
identified as non-malicious, or alternatively, PDCs 2 and 3 are
identified as malicious. After iteration 2, the central PDC cuts
off communication with PDCs 2 and 3, and only calculates
the average of messages received from the unbiased PDCs,
leading to zk = 13 (a
k
1 + a
k
4 + a
k
5), ∀k > 2. The estimates
thereby asymptotically converge to the ideal solution z∗, as
expected.
C. Round-Robbin ADMM for Detecting the Malicious Users
Algorithm 1, though very simple to implement, may suffer
from computational challenges as the central PDC has to
process 2nN number of elements at every iteration k. In
practice, there may be thousands of virtual computers installed
in a cloud network serving the purpose of these local PDCs,
as shown in our recent paper [24], which makes N a very
large number. The computational memory of the central PDC
may not be able to track such a large number of variables per
iteration in real-time. Instead it may only want to track or keep
an eye on a much smaller number of variables such as only
the consensus vector zk which has 2n number of elements in
it. Under that condition, if any local estimate aki is corrupted
by bias ∆ki at every iteration, then it will be impossible for the
central PDC to identify the malicious PDCs, or identify which
PDCs are unbiased, just by tracking zk. The main question,
therefore, is how can the central PDC catch the manipulators
by simply tracking zk over every iteration? We next propose
a variant of (6) using a Round-Robin strategy replacing the
6TABLE I
COMPARISON OF S-ADMM AND RR-ADMM FOR DETECTION OF ATTACKS WITH LARGE BIASES
Variable used for detection Minimum # of computations per iteration Minimum # of iterations needed to identify Bias Magnitude
S-ADMM akav,j
N(N−1)
2
1 Less stringent
RR-ADMM zkrr 1 kmin +N More stringent
averaging step (6c) to solve this problem. We refer to this
algorithm as Round-Robin ADMM or RR-ADMM in short.
The basic strategy for RR-ADMM is as follows. At iter-
ation k = 1, for example, the central PDC receives local
estimates a1j from every local PDC, but computes z
1 simply
as z1 = αa11, where α is a constant non-zero number. Then
the central PDC sends z1 back to the local PDCs following
Step 4 of S-ADMM. Similarly, in iteration k = 2, the central
PDC uses z2 = αa22, at iteration k = 3 it uses z
3 = αa33,
and so on. In general, zk = αak((k−1) mod N)+1. N successive
iterations constitute one period of RR-ADMM where N is the
total number of local PDCs. After N iterations, the central
PDC will again start from PDC 1, then PDC 2, and so on. For
convenience of expression, we denote the consensus variables
of RR-ADMM and S-ADMM at iteration k as zkrr and z
k
av , the
latter being updated in (6c). Similarly, the local PDC estimates
and its dual variable will be denoted as akrr,j and w
k
rr,j , and
akav,j as in (6b) and w
k
av,j as in (6a), 1 ≤ j ≤ N , respectively.
Remark: Note that the purpose of using RR-ADMM is
only to detect the malicious local PDC, not for obtaining the
optimal solution of (5). This is because this algorithm is run by
the central PDC stealthily, while every local PDC still believes
that the central PDC uses S-ADMM to calculate zk, and
thereby updates ak+1rr,j in the same way as in (6b). Therefore,
this algorithm should be treated more as a S-ADMM with a
RR-averaging step, rather than a true RR-ADMM where every
step of (6) would have to be modified in accordance to the RR
strategy.
Considering some of the PDCs to be malicious, the ADMM
update equations using RR-averaging can be written as:
wkrr,i =w
k−1
rr,i + ρ(a
k
rr,i − zkrr), (16a)
ak+1rr,i =((Hˆ
k
i )
T Hˆ
k
i + ρI)
−1((Hˆ
k
i )
T cˆki −wki + ρzkrr),
(16b)
zk+1rr =αa¯
k+1
rr,((k−1) mod N)+1
=α(ak+1rr,((k−1) mod N)+1 + ∆
k+1
((k−1) mod N)+1). (16c)
From (16c), it is clear that unlike S-ADMM where zkav
only depends on the average value of the biases, the ex-
pression for zkrr is influenced by the injection of the
[((k − 1) mod N) + 1]th PDC, i.e., ∆k((k−1) mod N)+1, which
provides a potential ‘signature’ to catch the identities of the
PDCs with disturbances. In [22], we proposed a way to
detect the malicious PDC by finding the maximum ξi =
|||zirr|| − ||zi+1rr |||+ |||zirr|| − ||zi−1rr |||, 1 < i < N + 1, which
holds only when there is exactly one malicious PDC. We
next provide an alternative algorithm that applies for multiple
attacks.
From (16), at iteration k, we can write the consensus vector
zkrr as
zkrr = α∆
k
b + α
(
(Hˆ
k−1
b )
T(Hˆ
k−1
b ) + ρI2n
)−1
×(Hˆk−1b )Tcˆk−1b −w0rr,b − ρ k−1∑
j=1
(ajrr,b − zjrr) + ρzk−1rr
 ,
(17)
where b = ((k − 1) mod N)+1. We assume that the minimum
absolute value of the element in the variable ∆kb is large
enough. It follows from (17) that the minimum value of ||zrr||
in one period must be from a non-malicious PDC. Let kmin
denote the iteration index in the period k = 1, . . . , N where
the magnitude of ||zkrr|| is minimum, 1 ≤ k ≤ N , and define
a threshold γz as
γz = ||zkmin+Nrr || − ||zkminrr ||. (18)
If ||zkrr|| > ||zkminrr || + γz , kmin ≤ k ≤ kmin + N − 1, then
the central PDC infers that the [(k−1) mod N + 1]th PDC is
attacked. Algorithm 2 summarizes this detection mechanism.
Notice that if the biases are constant, the central PDC does
not need to search for the minimum value of ||zkrr||, 1 ≤ k ≤
N , and the threshold γz can be defined as ||zN+1rr ||−||z1rr||. In
that case, the central PDC will only wait for N + 1 iterations,
not kmin +N iterations.
Consider the same example as in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 shows the
first element of the consensus vector zkrr before and after de-
tection using RR-ADMM. In the first period, ||z1rr|| = 0.2672,
||z2rr|| = 0.8192, ||z3rr|| = 1.4356, ||z4rr|| = 0.2964, and
||z5rr|| = 0.3064. Thus, ||z1rr|| is minimum and kmin = 1.
The threshold is computed as γz = ||z6rr|| − ||z1rr|| = 0.0497.
Only ||z2rr|| and ||z3rr|| are larger than γz + ||z1rr||. So PDCs
2 and 3 are identified as malicious. After detecting these
manipulators at iteration 6, the central PDC cuts off the
signal from PDCs 2 and 3, and only calculates the average
of messages received from the other local PDCs leading to
zkav =
1
3 (a
k
av,1 + a
k
av,4 + a
k
av,5), ∀k > 6. Note that at the
same time the dual variable wkj must be reset to its initial
value. At iteration 7, a7av,j is updated using the value of z
6
rr.
The requirement on the magnitude of the biases for suc-
cessful detection (i.e. for minimizing false positives) is much
more strict for RR-ADMM than for S-ADMM. This is because
the threshold γz is dependent on the speed of divergence of
the elements of zrr in one period. For S-ADMM, however,
a¯kav,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N are compared only at one iteration, and so
the biases are less affected by the speed of divergence. Also
note that if every element of the bias vector at every iteration
is non-zero, and the central PDC knows this information,
then the detection can be done by only using any chosen
7Algorithm 2 Identifying malicious PDC with general biases
using RR-ADMM
Detection:
1) At k = 1 every local PDC computes ak+1j in (6b) and w
k
j
in (6a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits these two to the central
PDC.
2) At k = 2 the central PDC calculates 1N
N∑
i=1
w1av,i. If
1
N
N∑
i=1
w1i 6= 02n×1, it suspects that there exists one or more
malicious PDCs in the system.
Identification:
3) If Step 2 is positive, for k > 2 the central PDC switches
to RR-ADMM. That is, every local PDC computes ak+1rr,j in
(16b) and wk+1rr,j in (16a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits them
to the central PDC.
4) When k ≥ N , the central PDC searches for the minimum
value ||zkminrr || in one period and its iteration index kmin.
5) Waiting till k ≥ kmin + N , the central PDC computes
the threshold γz = ||zkmin+Nrr || − ||zkminrr ||. It then compares
||zirr|| to ||zkminrr ||+ γz for kmin ≤ i ≤ kmin +N − 1.
6) If ||zirr|| > ||zkminrr ||+ γz , then the central PDC identifies
the [(i− 1) mod N + 1]th PDC to be malicious.
7) The central PDC repeats this classification for a few
iteration, say up to iteration s. If the identified non-malicious
PDCs are consistent through these iterations, it finally confirms
that these PDCs are unbiased.
8) Onwards from iteration s + 3, the central PDC ignores
any message coming from the malicious PDCs, and simply
carries out S-ADMM with the remaining non-malicious PDCs
using (6). The final solution of this S-ADMM will lead to the
solution of (5) as the LS problem is convex with s+ 3 being
an initial iteration for the rest of the non-malicious S-ADMM.
element of a¯kav,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n and zkrr (for S- and RR-
ADMM respectively) instead of using the vector norms. Table
I compares S-ADMM and RR-ADMM for detecting attacks
with large magnitudes.
D. Random Order of RR-ADMM
Note that the order of choosing the PDCs for the averaging
step in the RR-ADMM need not be fixed. The algorithm
should succeed with any random order as long as every PDC
is visited exactly once in a period. For example, if there are
4 local PDCs, then the central PDC need not follow the order
as (1, 2, 3, 4) for every period. It can, for instance, choose (1,
2, 3, 4) for the first period, (1, 3, 4, 2) for the second, (2, 4,
3, 1) for the third, and so on. This gives the central PDC the
flexibility in choosing zkrr in case any of the local estimates
do not arrive on time due to message loss or denial-of-service.
In that case, Algorithm 2 needs to be modified slightly to
accommodate this random order. After Step 3 in Algorithm
2, the central PDC should find the index of the local PDC
corresponding to the iteration index kmin. Let this PDC index
be m. Let k∗ be the iteration index between k = N + 1 and
k = 2N , considering zk
∗
rr = αa¯
k∗
rr,m. The threshold is then
changed to γz = ||zk∗rr || − ||zkminrr ||. After that the central
Fig. 3. Evolution of the average zk before and after detection using RR-
ADMM. For convenience, we only show the first element of zk .
PDC compares ||zkrr|| to γz + ||zkminrr ||, 1 < k < N . If
||zkrr|| > γz + ||zkminrr || and if zkrr = αa¯krr,i∗ , then the i∗th
PDC is identified as malicious.
We will illustrate this approach using a real power system
simulation in Case 5 of Section VI.
IV. DATA MANIPULATIONS WITH SMALL BIASES
A. S-ADMM for Detecting Malicious Users with Small Biases
The basic approach for this method is the same as in Section
III-B. Recall equations (10) and (11) as follows. For i ∈ S and
j /∈ S
dk+1i,j = (Li −Lj)a˜k + (P i − P j)∆k + ∆k+1i , (19)
while if i, j /∈ S, then
dk+1i,j = (Li −Lj)a˜k + (P i − P j)∆k
= (Li −Lj)a˜k + ρ(Ai −Aj)∆k (20)
where the last equation follows from the definition of P in
Section II-B. The problem, however, is that if ||∆k+1i ||∞ is
small, then the value of ||ρ(Aj − Ai)∆k + ∆k+1i || in (19)
may become comparable to ||ρ(Ai−Aj)∆k|| in (20), thereby
leading to incorrect classification. One way to bypass this
would be to reduce the value of ρ > 0 such that the difference
between the LHS of (19) and (20) is still large enough for
detection despite ||∆k+1i ||∞ being a small number. Thus, the
only difference of this approach from that in Section III-B is
that the ISO must ask every local PDC to reduce their penalty
factor ρ once it realizes the presence of a false-data injector.
Algorithm 3 describes this method.
Notice that the penalty factor ρ is a private parameter,
and hence unknown to the attacker. However, following the
attack model stated in Section II-B, the communication link
connecting the central PDC to any of the local PDCs, is
assumed to be uncompromised. Thus, when the central PDC
broadcasts the instruction to reduce ρ, then every PDC whether
attacked or unattacked, must be able to follow this instruction.
This satisfies Step 3 of Algorithm 3.
8Fig. 4. Evolution of the norms of the local estimates, and the average zkav
before and after detection of attack with small biases using S-ADMM. For
convenience, we only show the first element of zkav .
Algorithm 3 Identifying malicious PDCs with small biases
using S-ADMM
Detection:
1) At k = 1 every local PDC computes ak+1j in (6b) and w
k
j
in (6a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits these two to the central
PDC.
2) At k = 2 the central PDC calculates 1N
N∑
i=1
w1av,i. If
1
N
N∑
i=1
w1i 6= 02n×1, it suspects that there exists one or more
malicious PDCs in the system.
Identification:
3) If Step 2 is positive, for k > 2 the central PDC asks every
individual PDC j to update ak+1av,j as in (6b) by reducing the
value of ρ, j = 1, . . . , N .
4) Every local PDC updates ρ, and computes ak+1av,j in (6b),
zk+1av in (6c), and w
k+1
av,j in (6a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits
them to the central PDC.
5) For all k > 2, the central PDC computes the difference
|||a¯kav,i|| − ||a¯kav,j |||, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , and the threshold γka . It
then compares these differences to the threshold, and separates
a¯kav into groups.
6) The central PDC finds the index j of the vectors a¯kav,j ,
1 ≤ j ≤ N , whose 2-norm is minimum. It then picks the
group where the vector with this index is located, and classifies
the group as unbiased.
7) The central PDC repeats this classification for a few
iteration, say up to iteration s. If the identified non-malicious
PDCs are consistent through these iterations, it finally confirms
that these PDCs are unbiased.
8) Onwards from iteration s+ 3, the central PDC ignores any
message coming from the malicious PDCs, resets the value of
ρ to its initial value, and simply carries out S-ADMM with the
remaining non-malicious PDCs using (6). The final solution
of this S-ADMM will lead to the solution of (5) as the LS
problem is convex with s+ 3 being an initial iteration for the
rest of the non-malicious S-ADMM.
Consider the same example as in Section III. As before,
we assume there are five local PDCs and one central PDC.
The second and the third local PDCs are malicious, i.e., they
send their estimates with two different arbitrary biases ∆k2 and
∆k3 at iteration k, respectively. Fig. 4 shows the trajectories
of the first element of the vector zkav and the first elements
of the un-biased vectors a¯kav,1, a¯
k
av,4, and a¯
k
av,5 pre and post
detection using S-ADMM. In Fig. 4, at the second iteration,
with ρ reduced to 10−9, ||a¯2av,1|| = 0.283, ||a¯2av,2|| = 0.8218,
||a¯2av,3|| = 1.4296, ||a¯2av,4|| = 0.2873, ||a¯2av,5|| = 0.2878.
The threshold is γ2a = 0.00215. a¯
2
av is separated into three
groups: a¯2av,1, a¯
2
av,4, and a¯
2
av,5 are in the first group, a¯
2
av,2
and a¯2av,3 are in the second and the third groups, respectively.
The value of ||a¯2av,4|| in the first group is minimum. Therefore,
PDCs 1, 4, and 5 are identified to be non-malicious which
matches with the true situation. After the second iteration,
the central PDC cuts off communication with PDCs 2 and 3,
and only calculates the average of messages received from the
other local PDCs leading to zkav =
1
3 (a
k
av,1 + a
k
av,4 + a
k
av,5),
k > 2. Notice that at iteration 3, ρ should be reset to 10−6.
The estimates asymptotically converge to the true solution z∗,
as expected.
B. RR-ADMM for Detecting Malicious Users with Small Bi-
ases
The basic requirement for successful identification using
S-ADMM is that the bias, no matter how small, should be
large enough so that the difference of estimates between a
malicious PDC and non-malicious PDC is notably larger than
that between two non-malicious PDCs. In this section, we
employ RR-ADMM using the dual variable wkrr,j instead of
the consensus variable zkrr for detection where this require-
ment is less stringent. From (16a) and (16c), the difference
wkrr,i −wk−1rr,i , considering α = 1, can be written as
wkrr,i −wk−1rr,i
= ρ(akrr,i − akrr,(k−1) mod N+1 −∆k(k−1) mod N+1). (21)
If 1 ≤ k ≤ N and i = k, then (21) is reduced to
wkrr,k −wk−1rr,k = ρ(akrr,k − akrr,k −∆kk) = −ρ∆kk. (22)
Therefore, if ∆kk = 02n×1, then w
k
rr,k − wk−1rr,k = 02n×1,
where 02n×1 is a 2n × 1 vector with all zero elements. This
indicates that if the ith PDC is not injected with any bias, then
at the ith iteration, wirr,i−wi−1rr,i = 02n×1; if this condition is
not met, the ith PDC must be malicious. The central PDC can
check for the above inequality to identify the malicious PDC.
For instance, at iteration 2, the central PDC should calculate
the difference w2rr,2 −w1rr,2. If the difference is not equal to
zero, PDC 2 must be malicious. At iteration 3, the central PDC
should check the difference w3rr,3−w2rr,3; at iteration N + 1,
the central PDC should check the difference wN+1rr,1 −wNrr,1.
Thus, after N + 1 iterations, the central PDC will be able
to detect the identities of all manipulators no matter what the
values of their biases are. Notice that for the exact accuracy of
identification, the central PDC should compare each element
of wkrr,k to the corresponding elements of w
k−1
rr,k . If the central
9PDC compares the norms ||wkrr,k|| to ||wk−1rr,k ||, then it is
possible that under the condition ∆k(k−1) mod N+1 6= 02n×1,
these two norms may turn out to be equal thereby making
the identification inaccurate. The upshot is that every local
PDC now must also send the dual variable to the central
PDC at every iteration, thereby increasing the volume of the
transmitted messages. It must be noted, again, that the RR-
ADMM should only be used for catching data-manipulators,
and not to solve the optimal solution of (5). Algorithm 4
summarizes the RR-ADMM strategy.
Algorithm 4 Identifying malicious PDCs with small biases
using RR-ADMM
Detection:
1) At k = 1 every local PDC computes ak+1j in (6b) and w
k
j
in (6a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits these two to the central
PDC.
2) At k = 2 the central PDC calculates 1N
N∑
i=1
w1av,i. If
1
N
N∑
i=1
w1i 6= 02n×1, it suspects that there exists one or more
malicious PDCs in the system.
Identification:
3) If Step 2 is positive, for k > 2 the central PDC calculates
the consensus variable zkrr using RR-ADMM instead of S-
ADMM.
4) Every local PDC updates akrr in (16b), z
k
rr in (16c), and
wkrr in (16a), j = 1, . . . , N , and transmits them to the central
PDC.
5) After N + 1 iterations, the central PDC calculates the
differences wirr,i − wi−1rr,i , 2 ≤ i ≤ N , and the difference
wN+1rr,1 −wNrr,1. It then checks if these differences are exactly
zero or not. PDCs showing non-zero differences are classified
as malicious.
6) The central PDC repeats this classification for a few
iteration, say up to iteration s. If the identified malicious PDCs
are consistent through these iterations, it finally confirms these
PDCs are malicious.
7) Onwards from iteration s + 3, the central PDC ignores
any message coming from the malicious PDC, resets the dual
variable ws+3j to its initial value, and simply carries out S-
ADMM with the remaining non-malicious PDCs using (6).
The final solution of this S-ADMM will lead to the solution
of (5) as the LS problem is convex with s+ 3 being an initial
iteration for the rest of the non-malicious S-ADMM.
Note that in Step 2 of Algorithm 4, the only way for a
malicious PDC to fool the central PDC will be to send identical
values of its dual variable over two successive iterations.
However, fortunately the local PDCs do not know that the
central PDC is running RR-ADMM and that too in what
order. Therefore, this is a rather unlikely situation. Even if the
malicious PDCs send incorrect values of the dual variables,
the detection is still possible as (22) will still hold. That is,
every good PDC must obey Step 2 for the detection to be
successful.
Consider the same example as in Fig. 4. Fig. 5 shows the
trajectory of the first element of the vectors zk pre and post
Fig. 5. The response of zk before and after detection of attack with small
biases using RR-ADMM .
detection. In the top figure of Fig. 5, w2rr,2(1) −w1rr,2(1) =
10−10 and w3rr,3(1) − w2rr,3(1) = 1.2 × 10−10. The central
PDC also calculates w4rr,4−w3rr,4 = 02n×1, w5rr,5−w4rr,5 =
02n×1, and w6rr,1−w5rr,1 = 02n×1, which means PDCs 1, 4,
and 5 are non-malicious. After iteration 6, the central PDC cuts
off communication with the malicious PDCs, and calculates
the consensus vector using S-ADMM which is the same as the
one in Fig. 4. The bottom figure of Fig. 5 shows the consensus
variable zkrr before detection and z
k
av after detection. Notice
that at iteration 7, a7j is reinitialized to the value based on z
6
rr,
and the dual variable w7j is reset to its initial value.
For calculating the differences of the dual variables over
two successive iterations of RR-ADMM, the central PDC has
to process only one number at every iteration; while from the
S-ADMM algorithm (6) it follows that the central PDC has
to process at least N(N−1)2 numbers of computations at every
iteration. Thus if N is large then RR-ADMM will require
much less computation time than S-ADMM. Table II compares
S-ADMM and RR-ADMM for detection of small biases.
V. COMPARISON BETWEEN S-ADMM AND RR-ADMM
It must be noted, again, the RR-ADMM should only be
used for catching data-manipulators, not to solve the optimal
solution. In fact, in this section we show that the steady-
state solutions of S-ADMM and RR-ADMM with ∆kj = 0
are different from each other, which means that if the central
PDC only executes RR-ADMM it will not be able to obtain an
accurate solution. From Eq. (16b), the value of zkrr depends
on the coefficient α. Generally, if α 6= 1, zkrr 6= zkav with
∆kj = 0. Thus, we only consider the case of α = 1.
We assume w0av,j = w
0
rr,j and z
0
av = z
0
rr. Thus, a
1
av,j =
a1rr,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ N . However, z1av,j 6= z1rr,j , because in each
iteration Hˆi 6= Hˆj and a1av,j 6= a1av,i, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , i 6= j.
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TABLE II
S-ADMM AND RR-ADMM FOR DETECTION WITH MULTIPLE SMALL BIASES
Variable used for detection Minimum # of computations per iteration Minimum # of iterations needed to identify
S-ADMM akav,j
N(N−1)
2
1
RR-ADMM wkrr,j 1 N + 1
When k → ∞, zkav = akav,j . In that situation, without loss
of generality, we assume zkrr = a
k
rr,j . Thus z
k
av − zkrr =
akav,j − akrr,j . Let Akj = ((Hˆ
k
j )
THˆ
k
j + ρI2n)
−1, and Bkj =
(Hˆ
k
j )
Tckj −w0j . According to Eqs. (6b) and (16b), when k →
∞, the difference between ak+1av,j and ak+1rr,j can be deduced as
ak+1av,j − ak+1rr,j = ρ
k∑
i=1
f i(A1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ)(z
i
av − zirr), (23)
where
f1(A1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ) =
(−1)(k−1)
k∏
i=1
Aijρ
k−1 +
k−1∑
l=0
(−1)l
k∏
i=k−l
Aijρ
l
+(−1)k−2
k−1∑
l=2
2ρk−2
k∏
i=1
Aij
Alj
+ . . .+ (−1)
k−1∑
l=1
ρAkjA
l
j , k ≥ 2,
(24)
f2(A2j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ) =
(−1)(k−2)2
k∏
i=2
Aijρ
k−2 +
k−2∑
l=0
(−1)l
k∏
i=k−l
Aijρ
l
+(−1)k−3
k−1∑
l=3
2ρk−3
k∏
i=2
Aij
Alj
+ . . .+ (−1)
k−1∑
l=2
ρAkjA
l
j , k ≥ 3,
(25)
...
fk(Akj ) = 2A
k
j , k ≥ 1. (26)
The expressions for the various functions in (23) are derived
in the Appendix A.
Since zkav 6= zkrr, k ≥ 1, and the value of
f i(A1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are not equal to zero in general,
the difference between akav,j and a
k
rr,j is not equal to zero.
In fact, the following corollary can be written from (23).
Corollary I: zkrr = z
k
av , k →∞ only if Hˆi = Hˆj , a0av,i =
a0av,j = a
0
rr,i = a
0
rr,j , and w
0
av,i = w
0
av,j = w
0
rr,i = w
0
rr,j ,
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , i 6= j.
Proof: Based on Eq. (6b), because Hˆi = Hˆj and
a0av,i = a
0
av,j , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , i 6= j, a1av,i = a1av,j = z1av .
Then this result could be extended to any iteration, i.e., akav,i =
akav,j = z
k
av . Due to the same update equations of a
k
av and
akrr, and the same initial values, a
k
av,i = a
k
rr,i = z
k
av = z
k
rr
for every k, which follows directly from (23).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
To verify our algorithms we consider the IEEE 68-bus
power system model shown in Fig. 6. The system is divided
into 5 areas, each with one local PDC and 3 PMUs. Fig.
7 shows the communication between the 5 local PDCs and
the central PDC. The red lines denote that the PDCs sending
messages through these links are attacked. In this case, PDC
2 and PDC 3 are malicious. The simulated measurements are
obtained using the Power System Toolbox (PST) nonlinear dy-
namics simulation routine s simu and the data file data16m.m
[25]. We set ρ = 10−6. The synchronous generators are
assumed to have 6th-order models for simplicity. Since there
are 16 generators, our proposed algorithm should ideally solve
a 96th-order polynomial. However, our previous work on this
model as reported in [2] show that choosing 2n = 40 yields a
reasonably satisfactory estimate of the inter-area modes. The
true values of the four inter-area modes −σi±jΩi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4,
obtained by PST are−0.32557±j2.2262,−0.31429±j3.2505,
−0.43118± j3.5809, and −0.43011± j4.9836.
Next, we use the ADMM algorithm to estimate the oscilla-
tion modes. The following cases are considered for the purpose
of illustrating the results.
Case 1:) S-ADMM with no attack.
We first deploy the standard ADMM algorithm with no
attacks. The four inter-area modes −σi ± jΩi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4,
converge to their global values after 25 iterations. These values
are estimated to be −σ1± jΩ1 = −0.3250± j2.2231, −σ2±
jΩ2 = −0.3144± j3.2537, −σ3± jΩ3 = −0.4325±3.5847i,
and −σ4 ± jΩ4 = −0.4296± j4.9862, all of which are close
to their true values.
Fig. 8 shows four selected estimated modes, σ and Ω
per iteration. They converge to their global values within 25
iterations. The dashed lines show the actual values of σ and
Ω for these four modes obtained from PST.
Case 2:) S-ADMM with attacks.
Next we assume that PDCs in Area 2 and 3 are compro-
mised, and respectively sends messages with arbitrary biases
∆k2 and ∆
k
3 , generated using the random number generator in
Matlab. This architecture is shown in Fig. 7. Fig. 9 shows the
estimations of σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, per iteration for the four inter-
area modes. The dashed lines show the actual values of σi.
Same holds for the estimates of Ω. It can be seen that without
detection and mitigation, the trajectories of the estimates keep
diverging due to the additive effect of the bias.
Case 3:) S-ADMM for detecting data manipulators with
general biases.
We next apply Algorithm 1 to catch the malicious PDCs 2
and 3. Fig. 10 shows the norms of the vector a¯kav,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
At the first iteration, ||a¯1av,1|| = 0.7286, ||a¯1av,2|| = 6.4435,
||a¯1av,3|| = 6.839, ||a¯1av,4|| = 0.7313, ||a¯1av,5|| = 0.7189. The
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Fig. 6. IEEE 68-bus model
Fig. 7. Architecture for a 5-area power system network with 2 malicious
PDCs.
threshold γ1a = 0.0485. a¯
1
av is separated into three groups:
a¯1av,1, a¯
1
av,4, and a¯
1
av,5 are in the first group, a¯
1
av,2 and a¯
1
av,3
are in the second and third groups, respectively. According to
Algorithm 1, the minimum value ||a¯1av,5|| is in the first group.
Therefore, PDCs 1, 4, and 5 are identified as non-malicious,
which matches the true situation. Fig. 11 shows the estimations
of σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 for the four inter-area modes after PDCs 2 and
3 are disconnected. The dashed lines show the actual values of
σi. The final values of the estimates of σi in this case match
with their actual values again.
Considering the same example, Fig. 12 shows the norm and
the first four elements of the consensus vector zkav using S-
ADMM. None of these trajectories has any signature of the
Fig. 8. Four estimated oscillation modes using S-ADMM with no attack.
biases from PDCs 2 and 3, and hence it is impossible to
identify them by just tracking zkav .
Case 4:) RR-ADMM for detecting data manipulators with
general biases.
We next apply Algorithm 2 to detect the malicious PDCs
2 and 3. The top figure of Fig. 13 depicts the norm of the
consensus vector zkrr using RR-ADMM. From iteration 1 to
iteration 5, ||z1rr|| = 0.267 is minimum. ||z6rr|| = 0.4991
and the threshold is γz = 0.2321. ||z2rr|| > ||z1rr|| + γz and
||z3rr|| > ||z1rr|| + γz , so PDCs 2 and 3 are identified as
malicious. The bottom panel of Fig. 13 shows the norm of
the consensus vector zkav using S-ADMM. The trajectory of
||zkav|| does not contain any attack signature, and hence the
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Fig. 9. Four estimated inter-area modes using S-ADMM with attack. The
corresponding four true values of σi are shown by dashed lines.
Fig. 10. Evolution of ||a¯kav,j || when S-ADMM is run under attacks.
malicious PDCs cannot be identified from it. Fig. 14 shows
the estimations of σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 for the four inter-area modes
after PDCs 2 and 3 are disconnected using RR-ADMM. The
dashed lines show the actual values of σi. The final values of
the estimates of σi in this case match with their true values
again.
Case 5:) RR-ADMM for detecting the data manipulators
with random order.
In this case, the central PDC chooses the order of the local
PDCs are (1, 2, 4, 5, 3) for the first period, (3, 2, 5, 4, 1) in
the second period, and (2, 5, 4, 1, 3) in the third period. α =
0.9. Fig. 15 shows the trajectory of ||zkrr||. ||z1rr|| = 0.767,
||z2rr|| = 63.4122, ||z3rr|| = 2.6447, ||z4rr|| = 3.5022, and
||z5rr|| = 126.8068. ||z1rr|| is smaller than others in the first
period, and αz1rr is equal to the data from the third local PDC.
So in the second period, the central PDC assigns the estimate
of the third PDC as the consensus variable, which is z10rr .
The threshold is γz = ||z10rr|| − ||z1rr|| = 17.1055. ||z2rr|| >
||z1rr|| + γz and ||z5rr|| > ||z1rr|| + γz , and z2rr = αa¯2rr,2
and z5rr = αa¯
5
rr,3. Hence, the PDCs 2 and 3 are identified as
Fig. 11. Values of the real parts of the four inter-area modes before and after
detection using S-ADMM. True values of σi are shown by dashed lines.
Fig. 12. Evolutions of ||zkav || and the first four elements of zkav when S-
ADMM is run under attacks.
Fig. 13. Evolutions of ||zk|| when RR-ADMM and S-ADMM are run under
attacks.
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Fig. 14. Values of the real parts of the four inter-area modes before and after
detection with RR-ADMM. True values of σi are shown by dashed lines.
Fig. 15. ||zkrr|| with random order of RR-ADMM.
malicious, which matches the true situation.
Case 6:) S- and RR-ADMM for detecting data manipulators
with sparse and non-sparse biases.
In this case, we test the sensitivity of S-ADMM and RR-
ADMM with respect to the sparsity in the elements of the
bias. We compare two scenarios. In both scenarios the biases
chosen to be constant over time. We assume PDCs 2 and 3
are attacked. In the first scenario, all entries of ∆2 and ∆3
are zero except ∆2(5) = 0.1 and ∆3(5) = 0.2. In the second
example, ∆2 = 0.1√2n12n×1 and ∆3 =
0.2√
2n
12n×1. Thus the
norms of the respective bias vectors in the two examples are
the same. Fig. 16 draws the trajectories of ||a¯kav,j ||, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5,
using S-ADMM in these two examples. The top figure shows
the first scenario, i.e., the case when the bias vector is sparse,
while the bottom figure shows the case for non-sparse bias.
For both examples, S-ADMM can catch the attacked PDCs
2 and 3 successfully by separating the estimates into three
correct groups, namely PDCs (1, 4, 5) in one group and
PDCs (2, 3) in other two groups, respectively. Fig. 17, on
Fig. 16. The response of ||a¯kav,j || with sparse biases and non-sparse biases
using S-ADMM.
the other hand, shows the trajectories of ||zkrr|| using RR-
ADMM for these two examples. The top figures shows the
scenario with sparse bias. In the first period, ||z1rr|| = 0.6579,
||z2rr|| = 1.6434, ||z3rr|| = 4.534, ||z4rr|| = 7.3559, and
||z5rr|| = 10.2282. ||z1rr|| is minimum, and ||z6rr|| = 13.0892.
Hence, the threshold is γz = ||z6rr|| − ||z1rr|| = 12.4313.
||zkrr|| < γz + ||z1rr||, 1 ≤ k ≤ 5. Therefore, according to
Algorithm 2, none of the PDCs are detected to be malicious.
When the bias is non-sparse, however, RR-ADMM identifies
the malicious PDCs successfully, as shown in the bottom
figure. This example shows that S-ADMM is fairly insensitive
to the sparsity pattern in the elements of the bias vector since
it compares the estimate of every individual local PDC. RR-
ADMM, on the other hand, may show false positives when
the attack vector is sparse since it relies only on the consensus
vector for detection.
Finally, Fig. 18 shows the trajectories of ||zkav|| computed
using S-ADMM for both sparse and non-sparse cases. Neither
of these trajectories has any signature by which PDCs 2 and
3 can be identified to be malicious. This, again, clearly shows
that if the central PDC wants to track only the consensus
variable for detection, then S-ADMM is of no use, and it must
resort to RR-ADMM.
Case 7:) S-ADMM for detecting data manipulators with
small biases.
Let the second and the third PDCs be respectively injected
with ∆k2 = 0.002× 12n×1 and ∆k3 = 0.003× 12n×1. Fig. 19
shows the norm of the vector a¯kav,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N with different
values of ρ. In the top figure of Fig. 19, with ρ = 10−6 as
before, at the second iteration, ||a¯2av,1|| = 0.5857, ||a¯2av,2|| =
0.5884, ||a¯2av,3|| = 0.5927, ||a¯2av,4|| = 0.5852, ||a¯2av,5|| =
0.5902. The threshold γ2a = 0.0015. a¯
2
av is separated into four
groups: a¯2av,1 and a¯
2
av,4 are in the first group, a¯
2
av,2, a¯
2
av,3, and
a¯2av,5 are in the second, third and fourth groups, respectively.
The minimum value a¯2av,4 is in the first group. Therefore,
PDCs 2, 3, and 5 are treated as malicious which is a false
positive. The bottom figure of Fig. 19 depicts the norm of a¯kav,j
with ρ reduced to 10−9. At the second iteration, ||a¯2av,1|| =
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Fig. 17. The response of ||zkrr|| with sparse biases and non-sparse biases
using RR-ADMM.
Fig. 18. The response of ||zkav || with sparse biases and non-sparse biases
using S-ADMM.
Fig. 19. Evolutions of ||a¯kav,j || with multiple biases and different values of
ρ using S-ADMM.
Fig. 20. Values of the real parts of the four estimated inter-area modes before
and after detection using S-ADMM with small biases. True values of σi are
shown by dashed lines.
Fig. 21. The first element of wkrr,j from the local PDCs.
0.6819, ||a¯2av,2|| = 0.6841, ||a¯2av,3|| = 0.6859, ||a¯2av,4|| =
0.6811, ||a¯2av,5|| = 0.6817. The threshold γ2a = 0.00084. a¯2av
is separated into three groups: a¯2av,1, a¯
2
av,4, and a¯
2
av,5 are in
the first group, a¯2av,2 and a¯
2
av,3 are in the second and third
groups, respectively. ||a¯2av,4|| in the first group is minimum.
Therefore, PDCs 1, 4, and 5 are non-malicious which matches
the true situation. Top figure of Fig. 20 shows the estimations
of σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, for the four inter-area modes. The dashed
lines show the actual values of σi. The final values of the
estimates of σi in this case do not match their actual values,
due to the undetected bias. The estimates are divergent, but
due to the specific choice of ∆, the rate of divergence is slow,
and, hence, not very visible. The bottom figure of Fig. 20
shows the estimations of σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, for the four inter-area
modes. After the malicious PDCs 2 and 3 are cut off, the final
values of the estimates of σi match their true values again.
Case 8:) RR-ADMM for detecting data manipulators with
small biases.
Consider the same example as in Case 7. Fig 21 shows
15
Fig. 22. ||akav,j || with ρ = 10−9 and the first element of wkrr,j with
ρ = 10−6.
the first element of wkrr,j from the individual PDCs. Only the
red and yellow curves in their own color cycles are not flat,
i.e., w2rr,2(1) − w1rr,2(1) 6= 0 and w3rr,3(1) − w2rr,3(1) 6= 0.
The central PDC calculates w4rr,4 −w3rr,4 = 02n×1, w5rr,5 −
w4rr,5 = 02n×1, and w
6
rr,1 − w5rr,1 = 02n×1. Thus, PDCs
2 and 3 are identified as attacked, which matches the true
condition.
Consider another example: ∆k2 = 0.0001×12n×1 and ∆k3 =
0.0002×12n×1. The top figure of Fig. 22 depicts the norm of
a¯kav,j from the individual PDCs with ρ = 10
−9. At the second
iteration, ||a¯2av,1|| = 0.6823, ||a¯2av,2|| = 0.6812, ||a¯2av,3|| =
0.6816, ||a¯2av,4|| = 0.6811, ||a¯2av,5|| = 0.6817. The threshold
γ2a = 0.00024. a¯
2
av is separated into three groups: a¯
2
av,2 and
a¯2av,4 are in the first group, a¯
2
av,3 and a¯
2
av,5 are in second
group, and a¯2av,1 is in the third group. The minimum value
||a¯2av,4|| is in the first groups. Thus PDCs 1, 3, and 5 are
treated as malicious. This shows that even with smaller value
of ρ, there may be instances when S-ADMM may identify
a wrong PDC. The bottom figure of Fig. 22 shows the first
element of wkrr,j using RR-ADMM with ρ = 10
−6. After
6 iterations, w2rr,2(1) − w1rr,2(1) = 10−10 and w3rr,3(1) −
w2rr,3(1) = 2 × 10−10. The central PDC calculates w4rr,4 −
w3rr,4 = 02n×1, w
5
rr,5−w4rr,5 = 02n×1, and w6rr,1−w5rr,1 =
02n×1, which means PDCs 1, 4, and 5 are non-malicious.
RR-ADMM, in this case, therefore identifies all the malicious
PDCs successfully. This example shows that RR-ADMM, in
general, is more robust to the value of ρ than S-ADMM.
Fig. 23 shows the estimation of σi when the central PDC
uses RR-ADMM based on the dual variable wkrr,i to catch the
malicious PDCs 2 and 3. These PDCs are detected at iteration
7, onwards from which the central PDC cuts them off and
continues S-ADMM with the non-malicious PDCs. The final
values of the estimates of σi match with their true values again.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we developed four algorithms for revealing
the identities of malicious attackers in power system mode
estimation loops. The attack is modeled in terms of data
Fig. 23. Values of the real part of the four estimated inter-area modes before
and after detection using RR-ADMM. True value of σi is shown by dashed
lines.
manipulations in the messages passed between distributed
estimators. The need for a distributed architecture arises pri-
marily from the computational bottlenecks of this problem. For
example, a single centralized estimator may take an enormous
amount of time if it has to process hundreds of PMU mea-
surements. Dividing the computational burden among multiple
estimators soothes this complexity. The upshot, however, is
that increasing the number of estimators also means increasing
the number of communication links for information exchange,
and therefore, increasing the risk of cyber-attacks in these
channels. Moreover, in the centralized case, the entire esti-
mation will fail if the estimator is attacked. In the distributed
case, however, even if any of the estimators are attacked, the
estimation can still be sustained using the detection algorithms
presented in the paper. The speed of convergence may suffer
due to PDCs being cut off, but the accuracy of the estimation
will still be guaranteed following the consensus nature of
the problem. The specific application presented here is wide-
area oscillation estimation, although the same technique can
be used for other applications such as distributed dispatch,
optimal power flow, and distributed control problems as well.
Future work in this area will include generalizing the detection
and correction procedures to more specialized attack models
such as denial-of-service [26], jamming attacks on GPS signals
[27] and [28], and eavesdropping..
APPENDIX A
EXPRESSIONS OF f(·) FUNCTIONS IN (23):
The derivation of the functions f(·) in (23) follows from
induction, shown in the three steps as follows.
Step 1: When k = 1, f1(A1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ) =
f2(A2j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ) = . . . = f
k−1(Ak−1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ) = 0
and fk(Akj ) = 2A
1
j . Thus
a2av,j − a2rr,j = 2ρA1j (z1av − z1rr). (27)
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Step 2: For all k, k ≥ 2, assume
akav,j − akrr,j = ρ
k−1∑
i=1
f i(A1j , . . . , A
k
j , ρ)(z
i
av − zirr) (28)
Step 3: Under the assumption of Step 2, the difference
ak+1av,j − ak+1rr,j will be proved to satisfy Eq. (23).
According to (6b), the differences of ak+1rr −akrr and ak+1av −
akav are given by
ak+1rr
Akj
−Bkj −
akrr
Ak−1j
+Bk−1j = ρ
(−akrr,j + 2zkrr − zk−1rr ) ,
(29)
ak+1av
Akj
−Bkj −
akav
Ak−1j
+Bk−1j = ρ
(−akav,j + 2zkav − zk−1av ) .
(30)
Then the difference between ak+1av and a
k+1
rr is
ak+1av − ak+1rr = ρAkj (akav − akrr) +
Akj
Ak−1j
(akav − akrr)
+ 2ρAkj (z
k
av − zkrr)−Akj ρ(zk−1av − zk−1rr ).
(31)
Substituting (31) into (28), the difference between ak+1av and
ak+1rr can be expressed as in (23).
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